

Special Attaché Boylston Beal, the “Red Scare,” and the Origins of the US-UK Intelligence Relationship, 1919–27

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Introduction

In March 1919, Bolshevik leader V.I. Lenin created the Third Communist International, or Comintern, to assist communist parties in other countries take power and accelerate the overthrow of world capitalism. In the United States, at a time when union strikes, race riots, and political violence were gripping the nation, Lenin’s call for revolution sparked further unrest and division. In late April, political terrorists mailed parcel bombs to prominent politicians, judges, and state officials. Ultrnationalist groups responded by attacking May Day celebrations. State authorities passed sedition laws, banned red flags, and used anti-anarchy laws to arrest writers accused of espousing violence. Two months after the parcel bombs, militants struck again, detonating explosives almost simultaneously in eight different American cities.¹

In response to the attacks, the US Congress appropriated special funds to bolster the Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation—the forerunner to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—and tasked it with catching the bombers. The newly-formed General Intelligence Division (GID), better known as the Radical Division, took charge. Under the direction of a young and ambitious lawyer, J. Edgar Hoover, the division focused on deporting members



The scene on Wall Street after an estimated 100 lbs of dynamite packed into a horse-drawn carriage also carrying pieces of steel exploded on Wall Street on 16 September 1920, killing 30 people. Violence such as this immediately following World War I was often attributed to communists groups and led to intensification of efforts to track down communist organizations. The perpetrators of this act were never arrested, although the chief suspects were members of an Italian anarchist group. Photo © Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy Stock Photo, 16 September 1920.

of foreign left-wing organizations. The Justice Department launched two dragnet raids in November and December 1919, arresting thousands of suspected subversives and deporting hundreds more.² America’s first Red Scare, an intense period of antiradicalism that followed on the heels of World War I, resulted in a series of stringent immigration laws intended to protect the homeland from foreign dangers.³

The 1919 Red Scare also reinvigorated an Anglo-American intelli-

gence alliance that has endured for a century. The First World War had led to direct collaboration between British intelligence agencies and the US federal government, whereby British intelligence officers worked with members of the US Department of State’s Bureau of Secret Intelligence in the Office of the Counselor to counter German subversion and espionage.^{a,4}

a. Before the First World War, the British Home Office, Irish Office, and India Office

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Despite a divergence of interests between political leaders in Washington and London during the postwar years, this information-sharing relationship continued to operate, indeed flourished, among State Department officials and British police and intelligence officers in London after the war. The primary intelligence target, however, had shifted from Imperial Germany to Soviet Bolsheviks and the subversive actions of the Communist International.⁵

State Department records and British intelligence reports show how throughout this period, the Department of State played the lead role in the collection and analysis of political intelligence and in efforts to counter Bolshevism at home and abroad. They also demonstrate how liaison relationships with the British government shaped the department's intelligence activities and assessments of the threat posed by Soviet proxies and how reports from members of the British intelligence services and US diplomats chronicled Soviet support of foreign terrorist organizations through the Comintern.

The burgeoning sharing of intelligence between the United Kingdom and United States contrasted with a general deterioration of postwar Anglo-American relations. Indeed, in most areas of policy, the United States and British Empire functioned more as adversaries than as allies. For example, the former allies competed in a naval buildup and disagreed about economic and foreign policy. US military planners considered the United Kingdom as

the most dangerous antagonist in the Atlantic and developed War Plan RED in response to potential military confrontations, along with RED-ORANGE in case of Anglo-Japanese collaboration.⁶

Americans were also quick to condemn British imperialism, as wartime victories and the mandate system expanded Britain's empire to its largest territorial extent. The British, in turn, never forgot or forgave that the Americans had been "too proud to fight" for the first three years of the Great War. Resentment toward President Woodrow Wilson and his peace settlement, which failed to pass the Senate and kept the United States out of the League of Nations, further eroded trust.⁷

Special Assistant Boylston Beal: Letters from London

Policy elites and intelligence officers on both sides of the Atlantic, however, found common cause in monitoring the revolutionary regime in Russia and its Comintern, and from 1916 to 1928, they had the ideal American interlocutor in a Boston Brahmin lawyer named Boylston Adams Beal. As personalized by Beal—he would characterize his sources as "our friends"^a—the relationship between trans-Atlantic intelligence elites reflected not only shared interests and common enemies but also genuine friendship. What follows is the story of a forgotten official

a. The term "friends" is now associated with British slang for members of the Secret Intelligence Service (or MI6). See *Language of Espionage*, s.v. "friends," accessed 15 May 2019, <https://www.spymuseum.org/education-programs/spy-resources/language-of-espionage/#F>.



Beal passport photo, 1921. (NARA: see endnote 52.)

whose service during and after World War I helped to plant the seeds of an intelligence sharing arrangement that would eventually blossom into the Five Eyes relationship after the Second World War.

Born in Boston on 4 June 1865, Beal would later be described as "a typical Bostonian as evidenced by his name—a Boylston, an Adams, and a Beal," one whose "family was connected with the Boston life in many ways, social, banking, and literary."⁸ Beal's ancestors had come to America on the *Mayflower*; his family tree included Presidents John Adams and John Quincy Adams as well as philanthropist Ward Nicholas Boylston, the namesake of Boston's Boylston Street and Harvard University's Boylston Hall.

While an undergraduate at Harvard, Beal formed what became a lifelong friendship with classmate George Santayana, who would go on to teach philosophy and compose aphorisms. Santayana regarded Beal as a "pure and intense Bostonian of

oversaw limited intelligence operations in the United States, primarily monitoring the activities of Irish and Indian separatists.

the old school,” who aspired to live in “beautiful places, among refined people with honest and graceful minds,” who “admired traditional religion in the Roman and Anglican forms,” and who “was a pronounced conservative in politics.”⁹ After living together for a winter in Berlin following their graduation in 1886, Santayana and Beal reconnected when Beal returned to Harvard to obtain a law degree at a time Santayana was a lecturer there.

Law degree in hand, Beal married Elizabeth Sturgis Grew, the daughter of another esteemed Bostonian family, in October of 1893; they would have a daughter six years later. “I am afraid my life since the last Class Report would not be of much interest to anyone,” Beal submitted to his class secretary for the twentieth anniversary report in 1906. “I have been living quietly here, practicing law in a mild way, chiefly as trustee for several estates. I have been to Europe several times, all of which, however, is, I think, of little interest to anyone.”¹⁰

The outbreak of the Great War changed the trajectory of Beal’s life. In Berlin in 1914, Beal volunteered at the US embassy. He became a special assistant and oversaw work pertaining to safeguarding British interests in Berlin. He organized a special committee to assist the British government, communicating with Whitehall about the status of British property and the treatment of British subjects in the German Empire.¹¹


In January 1916, Secretary of State Robert Lansing transferred Beal to London and appointed him a special agent of the Department of State at \$2,000 a year plus travel expenses.¹² The next year, Beal became




Inset: Ambassador Walter Page (1913) Photo: Wiki Commons. Page’s offices were located at the far end of the fashionable rowhouses of Grosvenor Gardens, seen above in 1953. Photo © PA Images/Alamy Stock Photo.

honorary secretary of the London Chapter of the American Red Cross. As part of this work, he visited 23 prison camps in the United Kingdom and reported on the conditions for interned civilians and prisoners of war. In his reports, Beal described accommodations as “quite up to the standard usually prevailing in prison camps,” a description that would have certainly pleased his British hosts.¹³

Once in London, Beal drew upon personal and professional contacts, starting with his sister-in-law, Jane Grew Norton, who kept a residence there along with her husband, John Pierpont Morgan, Jr., whose father was keeping the Allies afloat during the First World War I through loans and financial assistance, even as the United States remained officially neutral. Beal was also close to the ambassador of the United States to the Court of St James’s, Walter Page,



In October 1921, Beal requested diplomatic passports for his wife and daughter, both named Elizabeth. The resulting back and forth about the propriety of the request reveal the unusual nature of Beal's assignment in London. Second Assistant Secretary of State Alvey Adee remarked on the special circumstances of Beal's possession of a diplomatic passport, but allowed it should not be questioned. (Blue note above.) Third Assistant Secretary Robert W. Bliss concurred and directed the issuance of passports to the two Elizabeths. (Application and notes found thanks to State Historian William B. McAllister. Source: Alvey Adee to Robert W. Bliss, Memorandum, October 14, 1921; Bliss to Adee, October 15, 1921, RG 59, Division of Passport Control, Special Diplomatic Passport Applications, 1916-1925, Vol. 9, Box 4225.)



who had alienated President Woodrow Wilson with his fervent pro-British stances long before the United States entered the war as an Associated Power on the side of the Allies in April 1917.

Through Page, Beal dined with other important wartime figures on both sides of the Atlantic, including Admiral William Benson, the first chief of US naval operations, who oversaw the massive transport of the American Expeditionary Forces to France.¹⁴ Beal also witnessed Ambassador Page's close relationship with his British counterparts and his establishment of a precedent of information-sharing at his embassy. The most important information passed

would be the deciphered "Zimmerman telegram."¹⁵

For much of the war, Anglo-American intelligence-sharing took place in the United States, particularly after the arrival of British intelligence's most successful "agent of influence," Sir William Wiseman, who set up the Secret Intelligence Service's Section V in New York. Wiseman cultivated President Woodrow Wilson's confidant, Colonel Edward House, who put him in touch with State Department Counselor Frank Polk. During the war, the Office of the Counselor worked with British officers on intelligence operations and even coordinated a joint operation with his London counterpart,

dispatching the British writer William Somerset Maugham to Russia.¹⁶

The wartime intelligence liaison with the United Kingdom continued even after the armistice of November 1918. Many officials in the State Department, sharing a similar class and educational background and having attended elite boarding schools and Ivy League colleges together, retained sympathy for their British counterparts.¹⁷

Within the State Department, the newly-established Office of the Undersecretary of State replaced the Office of the Counselor and inherited its portfolio. Meanwhile, Beal oversaw the transition of the Anglo-American

intelligence liaison from New York and Washington to the US embassy in London, serving as a special assistant and later honorary counselor at the embassy from 1916 to 1928, forsaking any compensation in the latter position.¹⁸ Tasked with “the more or less under-cover work,” he received confidential information from both Washington and Whitehall, and worked with officers in Britain’s first anti-terrorism unit, Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, and later with the Security Service, or MI5.^{a, 19}

While in London, Beal liaised with Captains Hugh Miller and Guy Liddell, two of Special Branch’s most talented intelligence officers, the “friends” Beal referred to in letters back to the Office of the Under Secretary of State.^b Through Beal and his successors at the embassy, the United States and United Kingdom shared information about the Comintern, American and British communists, and Soviet counterfeiting operations. The British provided reports on American citizens traveling in Europe who had been in contact with anarchists and communists in the United Kingdom; they also transmitted the names of members of the Anglo-American Section of the Comintern and the addresses of American radicals who received instructions from the Red International Labor Union to carry out Bolshevik propaganda work in the Philippines and in China.

a. Special Branch was formed in the 1880s in response to Irish nationalist bombings.

b. Beal regarded Captain Liddell, who would become head of MI5, as “one of the cleverest and most intelligent” of his friends.

UK Post-WWI Threat Perceptions

After initially focusing on the threat of pan-Islam and its ability to mobilize Muslims in British India against the Raj following the end of the Great War, the United Kingdom reoriented its intelligence agencies to combat communist subversion in the empire.²¹ The Soviet Union and Communist International replaced the wartime German government as the primary foreign sponsor of colonial unrest, promising support to revolutionary nationalists and Arab jihadists.²²

Indeed, Lenin had declared his hostility toward the British Empire at the outset of the October Revolution in 1917. He repudiated the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which had ended the rivalry between the British and Russian empires in Asia, and reinvigorated the “Great Game” of imperial rivalry—only this time as a contest of rival ideologies. “We have up to now devoted too little attention to agitation in Asia,” declared People’s Commissar Leon Trotsky in August 1919, as communist revolutions failed to consume the whole of Europe. “However, the international situation is evidently shaping in such a way that the road to Paris and London lies via the towns of Afghanistan, the Punjab and Bengal.”²³ The Comintern subsequently affirmed its commitment to assisting national liberation movements by helping communist operatives supply funds, military equipment, intelligence, and foreign fighters to assist anti-imperial and nationalist uprisings.²⁴

Convinced that Bolshevik leaders were employing the rhetoric of national self-determination in order to strengthen Soviet connections with anti-colonial movements in Turkey, Central Asia, Persia (Iran), India, and China, British intelligence officers attempted to increase American cooperation against communist subversion in regions of vital interest to the empire throughout the 1920s. Britain’s anticommunism initiatives reflected the government’s economic and oil interests, along with strategic and imperial imperatives such as the defense of India and transit routes to Asia.²⁵

Keeping the United States Engaged

The British even supplied copies of secret domestic intelligence reports prepared by the Home Office, MI5, and Special Branch on revolutionary organizations operating in the UK.²⁰ British intelligence officers tailored the information they shared with Beal so that British security concerns were harmonized with US homeland security concerns. International communism threatened empire and democracy in equal measure by the British depictions of the threat.

One case in 1926 illustrates how the British, seeing Beal as an intermediary to US policymakers, obscured the line between intelligence and policy advocacy. That year Beal reported to Foggy Bottom: “Our friends tell

me that it has come to their knowledge that one Kamal Hamud at the American University, Beirut, Syria, is proposing to place an order with the Communists here for a quantity of literature.” He proposed that the State Department warn university authorities; also, following a conversation with the chief of the Near East division (and future CIA director), Allen Dulles, he was relaying the information to the American consulate in Beirut.²⁶

British officials most certainly hoped that by sharing this information the Americans would intervene to keep communist propaganda from reaching Syria and disseminating outward. US officials reciprocated; each side got something from the oth-

British intelligence officers were keen to provide reports to Beal and US embassy officials demonstrating the links between Moscow and anticolonial organizations that cast the United States as a common foe in liberation struggles.

er. For instance, the British supplied information about developments in Latin America, as Special Branch and the secret services believed this was a region of special interest to the State Department. Beal's dispatches supplied US officials with information about the Chilean government's crackdown on communists and the underground retreat of the Chilean Communist Party.²⁷ After British authorities raided the All-Russian Cooperative Society (ARCOS) in London, Beal transmitted secret documents found on British communists that included information regarding Comintern agents operating in South American countries.²⁸

British intelligence officers were keen to provide reports to Beal and US embassy officials demonstrating the links between Moscow and anticolonial organizations that cast the United States as a common foe in liberation struggles. Beal's "friends" had obtained evidence, which he reported, that the Berlin-based League against Colonial Oppression, also known as the League against Cruelties and Oppression in the Colonies, had contacted the Mexican government in an attempt to secure arms and was "entirely under the control of Moscow and the Third International."²⁹

British intelligence agencies also cited connections between the Comintern and pan-Africanism. The embassy in London sent warning that Lovett Fort-Whiteman, an African-American activist, was traveling to Europe to meet with the

Communist Party in Great Britain in the hopes of organizing a World Congress of Negro Peoples. The British police were asking the State Department to keep them apprised of Fort-Whiteman's departure and movements.³⁰

In April 1928, London reported to Washington that the Comintern had "ordered the dispatch of six agitators from the Far East to the United States, with instructions to work among employees in textile industries and in important centres." British intelligence asserted that the Comintern would supply the agents with US passports, and that the "agitators" would be graduates of the Lenin Institute for Propaganda. The necessary funds would be paid through Mexican banks and that the agents would take different routes, leaving from Shanghai, Kobe, Hong Kong and Manila to reach the United States.³¹

The Limits of Sharing

Despite the close coordination between Beal and British officials, Anglo-American information sharing had its limits. In March 1926, Beal wrote the State Department that one of his most prominent friends had called on him to tell him that British intelligence felt that the center of Irish disaffection against the Free State Government was shifting to the United States. "My friend told me that he felt there were schemes [afoot] in the United States for giving help and assistance to those in Ireland who were unfavorable to the present Free State by either raising

money for that purpose or by sending arms and ammunition to Ireland," Beal reported. He emphasized that communist influence was exacerbating Irish disaffection. Beal probably included this information out of a belief that the State Department would only supply information on Irish groups in the United States who acted under the "order of the 'Reds' and were plotting for the overthrow of established government in Ireland and elsewhere."³²

More frequently, British officials asked for information about Indian groups in the United States who, they believed, were financing and supporting anti-colonial revolutionaries. During the First World War, British intelligence had emphasized the German sympathies and contacts of Indian revolutionaries in the United States, particularly the leaders of the Ghadr ("Mutiny") party.^{a, 33} After the war, the British stressed the communist affiliations of Indian nationalists, while Beal kept US officials informed about communism's encroachment in India and the activities of Indian revolutionaries in the United States.³⁴

In 1924, Beal wrote of a case in which Indians in Mexico were transmitting funds through the United State to India, and relayed a request from "our friends" to have the State Department quietly ascertain how much money had been moved to India.³⁵ In addition, Beal transmitted requests for information from the British police about Indian revolu-

a. In May 1918, a federal jury in San Francisco convicted 29 members of the Ghadr party for conspiring to foment revolution in India in violation of US neutrality. The "Hindu conspiracy" trial resulted in prison sentences for most of the defendants.

tionaries who traveled to or lived in the United States and American organizations such as the Indo-American Information Bureau and the National League of India that supported “Indian extremists.”³⁶

More Cautionary Notes

In May 1925, Beal asked Arthur Lane at the State Department to conduct a background search on an American citizen, Evelyn Roy, the wife of the Indian revolutionary and Comintern agent, Narendra Nath Bhattacharya, alias M. N. Roy. Beal justified the request by informing Washington that Evelyn Roy used a Mexican passport, promoted anti-British and pro-communist publications, and financially supported her husband, a member of the Executive Committee of the Third International.³⁷ Here Beal was nothing short of asking the State Department to spy on an American citizen on behalf of a foreign government.

Special Branch and MI5 regularly updated Beal about the “Indian terrorist movement” for the entirety of the interwar period. He sent on to the department descriptions of revolvers that were “irregularly imported into India” and which “got into the hands of Bengal revolutionists.” “Our friends would be most grateful if any inquiry might be made of the manufacturers of these revolvers, as to the hands through which they passed until they left America,” he told Lane. “Will you please see if you can let me have something for their information?”³⁸ Lane disagreed with using the State Department to conduct investigations of Indian revolutionaries in the United States, and told Beal that this type of work fell outside the department’s purview.³⁹

As he took reports from the Brits, Beal took the lead in relaying information from the department to British officials.

In January 1926, Beal wrote another State Department official, Alexander Kirk, asking for information about a man from South Asia residing in California. “I remember having a talk with Arthur Lane about these East Indians in America and his telling me that the feeling was that he could not go too far on Indian lines,” Beal remarked. “Still I cannot help feeling that there are strong indications of Bolshevik influence in India, and I feel sure that, if it seemed right and proper to send information from time to time (I rather think that they appreciate our feeling and so very seldom ask for information), it would be appreciated.”⁴⁰

As he took reports from the Brits, Beal took the lead in relaying information from the department to British officials. For example, he provided British intelligence copies of the US Senate’s hearings on the Soviet Union and additional notes from the Committee on Foreign Relations.⁴¹ In March 1926, Captain Liddell planned to travel to the United States for his honeymoon and wanted to visit Washington, DC. Beal wrote that Liddell wished to meet “some of the men in the Department who are interested in the same sort of work in which he is engaged.” In particular, Liddell wanted to discuss a secret report prepared by Special Branch on the Russian Trade Delegation and Revolutionary Organizations in the United Kingdom and the use of sailors to transmit revolutionary material between European and American ports.⁴²

The closely held relationship between Beal and British intelligence sometimes risked public scrutiny. For

example, an incident took place in India, where British authorities kept two American women under surveillance for alleged connections to Indian revolutionaries and searched their belongings upon departure. Afterward, Lane wrote Beal:

*Under the circumstances you may wish to consider the advisability of asking your friends to use great caution in investigating the activities of and keeping under surveillance American citizens abroad. Otherwise, as in the present case, unpleasant reactions are bound to ensue and we will have no end of difficulty in getting ourselves out of hot water. . . . [If] any publicity comes of this case it will not help the well-known cause of Anglo-American relations.*⁴³

As British and US officials discovered, revolutionaries in the United States and the United Kingdom were also coordinating their activities. The I.W.W. (Industrial Workers of the World) headquarters in Chicago kept an open channel to the Independent Labor Party in the United Kingdom and coordinated joint protests over the arrest and deportation of individuals for political offenses.⁴⁴

The case of Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, Italian immigrants and anarchists found guilty of murdering a paymaster and his guard during a robbery of a shoe factory in South Braintree, Massachusetts, led to a public outcry in the United Kingdom. The rejection of their appeals sparked further protests in the summer of 1927, as many in Britain wrote and visited the US embassy in

London to lodge complaints about the impending execution of the two men. In May 1927, Washington warned US officials in London to be vigilant, given the increasing threats of violence against American missions, including a recent attempt to blow up the US embassy in Buenos Aires and allegations that bombs had been sent to US embassies in Montevideo and Berne.⁴⁵ Protests against the Sacco and Vanzetti case led to bombings in three different American cities in August 1927, as well as attacks on American consulates, embassies, and banks in France, Bulgaria, and Argentina. As the embassy in London received a constant stream of bomb threats, embassy officers were in regular communication with Special Branch about anti-American demonstrations and security of American facilities.⁴⁶

This strong working relationship reflected what was by then a decade of US/UK information-sharing about militant and revolutionary groups. However, the two governments disagreed over labeling revolutionaries as terrorists, as the State Department periodically limited the information it provided Beal and the United Kingdom about the activities of Irish and Indian revolutionaries operating inside the United States. Nonetheless, the information Beal's personal contacts in Special Branch and British intelligence provided about the Comintern reinforced a belief among US officials that communism's expansion threatened US interests and values at home and abroad.^a

a. The case that the British would eventually use this US fear to influence its behavior in Iran in 1953 is made by Torey L. McMurdo, "The Economics of Overthrow: The United States, Britain, and the Hidden



The murder trial in 1927 in Massachusetts of Italian immigrants and anarchists Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti set off a firestorm of protest around the world, including in England. Concerns about harm to US properties sharpened the US/UK security relationship. Photo © History and Art Collection/Alamy Stock Photo.

Conclusion

In June 1927, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg abolished the intelligence section of the Office of the Under Secretary of State, the office that received Boylston Beal's reports. The closure led to a shift in the accumulation and interpretation of political intelligence to individual geographic sections. In the case of the Comintern and international communism, this meant information was redirected to the Division of Eastern European Affairs. Beal retired the following year. Captains Hugh Miller and Guy Liddell, both of whom moved to MI5 in 1931, continued to furnish the State Department with information until the late 1930s when Liddell began making overtures to the FBI.⁴⁷ While some information sharing with British intelligence officers

continued, anti-communism coordination between the two governments declined as both London and Washington adopted increasingly unilateral foreign policies to escape the depths of the Great Depression.

"Boylston Beal, honorary counselor of the American Embassy, known here as the 'last of the dollar-a-year men,' is leaving London to take up his residence in Boston," the *Washington Post* reported on 19 August 1928.⁴⁸ Not reported was that, for the previous decade, Beal had stood at the center of the Anglo-American intelligence relationship—a relationship that was built not only on mutual self interest, but also on highly personal factors. Beal's background and world view attracted him to policy and intelligence elites in London and convinced him of the specialness of the bond.

On 6 February 1926, King George presided over a ceremony in

Justification of Operation TPAJAX," in *Studies in Intelligence* 56, no. 2 (June 2012)

Southampton honoring the captain, officers, and crew of SS *President Roosevelt* which had come to the rescue of members of a British freighter adrift at sea following a storm in the mid-Atlantic.

“All of us realize that what America says and does is not always understood by England, and that what England says and does is not always understood by America,” proclaimed Boylston Beal on behalf of US Ambassador Alanson Houghton, who was out of the country.^a “But there are certain deeds

which cannot but be understood by the peoples of both lands and they are of inestimable value in drawing together these two great countries and keeping their mutual understanding clear – an understanding upon which many of us feel the well-being of the present world depends.”⁴⁹

Beal died in Boston in July 1944. He dismissed his twilight years as “uneventful” and never publicly acknowledged what his Harvard classmates described as his “unusual service abroad.”⁵⁰

a. Houghton was a Harvard classmate (1886) of Beal’s.

Afterword

A year before Beal died, US and British cryptanalysts had begun to share highly sensitive signals intelligence according to the wartime Communication Intelligence Agreement of 1943. The Second World War had led the United States and Great Britain to formalize the intelligence relationship that had been born during the First World War.^{b, 51} The arrangement would continue to grow, incorporating Canada, Australia, and New Zealand in the now well-established “Five Eye” relationship.

b. A second agreement followed in 1947, which extended and expanded Anglo-American cooperation into the Cold War. It remains in force today.



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26. Boylston Beal to Alexander Kirk, May 12, 1926, RG 59, Office of the Counselor / Under Secretary and the Chief Special Agent, Archives II, NARA.
27. Boylston Beal to Alexander Kirk, March 31, 1927, RG 59, Office of the Counselor / Under Secretary and the Chief Special Agent, Archives II, NARA.

28. Boylston Beal to Alexander Kirk, June 18, 1927, RG 59, Office of the Counselor / Under Secretary and the Chief Special Agent, Archives II, NARA.
29. Boylston Beal to Alexander Kirk, December 31, 1926, RG 59, Office of the Counselor / Under Secretary and the Chief Special Agent, Archives II, NARA.
30. Boylston Beal to Alexander Kirk, May 27, 1926, RG 59, Office of the Counselor / Under Secretary and the Chief Special Agent, Archives II, NARA. A member of the Communist Party, Fort-Whiteman received Comintern training in the Soviet Union and supported the cause of an American Negro Labor Congress. He died in a Soviet labor camp following Stalin's 1936–38 purges.
31. Ray Atherton to Robert Kelley, Division of Eastern European Affairs, April 20, 1928, RG 59, Office of the Counselor / Under Secretary and the Chief Special Agent, Archives II, NARA.
32. Boylston Beal to Alexander Kirk, March 25, 1926, RG 59, Office of the Counselor / Under Secretary and the Chief Special Agent, Archives II, NARA.
33. See Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism* (Oxford University Press, 2007), 85.
34. Boylston Beal to Norman Armour, April 29, 1924, RG 59, Office of the Counselor / Under Secretary and the Chief Special Agent, Archives II, NARA.
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48. "London Farewells Last U.S. Dollar-Year Man," *The Washington Post*, August 19, 1928, ES13.
49. "Ovation for Captain Fried," *The New York Times*, February 7, 1926, 25.
50. Harvard College Class of 1886, *Sixtieth Anniversary Report* (Anchor Linotype Printing Co., 1946).
51. See Boghardt, The Zimmermann Telegram, 244.
52. Boylston A. Beal passport photo can be found in RG 59 Division of Passport Control, Special Passport Applications, 1914–1925, Volume 3, Box 4190, NARA.



